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 Governing migration through mobility. Dispersal and containment at the 
internal frontiers of Europe. 
Martina Tazzioli (Swansea University) 
(forthcoming in Environment & Planning C) 
“Mobility” is by far one of the most frequently used words in political debates and statements that 
discuss the values upon which the EU is predicated and that are at the core of so-called liberal 
societies. In Security, Territory, Population, Michel Foucault famously contends that since the 
XVIII century the main governmental problem has been “a matter of organizing circulation, 
eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and 
maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad” (Foucault, 2007: 18). However, instead of 
flattening heterogenous practices of mobilities under the rubric of circulation, and referring to the 
government of mobility as such, what requires further investigation are the asymmetries through 
which different practices of mobility are governed (Bigo, 2011; De Genova, 2013; Fassin, 2007). In 
this regard, Claudia Aradau has introduced the expression “political grammars of mobility”, 
meaning by that “the relations between mobility, security and subjectivity”, pointing to the 
misleading tendency in the literature to regard mobility and circulation as synonymous, and to the 
need of investigating how “different forms of mobility matter for security practices” (Aradau, 2016: 
565). This also echoes what in this article I call governing migrant mobility through mobility, 
highlighting the twofold role of (forced) mobility, as an object of government and as a a technology 
for regaining control over migration. This article investigates how mobility works as a 
governmental technology for governing unruly mobility – meaning by that the movements of 
illegalized migrants – and, simultaneously, it focuses on the effects of containment beyond 
detention that the government of mobility through mobility generates. 
In critical migration literature expressions and terms like “border regime” (De Genova, 2016; 
Tsianos, Karakayali, 2010) and “contested politics of mobility” (Squire, 2011) are used to highlight 
the unequal and asymmetric functioning of borders as well as of migration policies. In particular, 
the increased presence of women, men and children seeking asylum in Europe, which has been 
framed by states and by the EU in terms of a “refugee crisis” and “migration crisis”, have put the 
government of mobility at the core of the EU’s political agenda (Bojadzijev, Mezzadra, 2015). The 
(non)governability of migrants’ presence and movements has gained central stage both in the media 
and at the level of states’ narratives.  
Migrants’ mobility as an object of modes of control has been widely explored in the literature. As 
critical migration scholarship has demonstrated, the mobility of illegalized migrants is subjected not 
only to arrest and detention but also to decelerations, disruption and selections (Bigo, 2002; 
Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013; Tazzioli, 2018). Yet, while the governing of mobility has gained centre 
stage in the academic debate, mobility as a technology for governing migration - what I call 
governing migrants’ mobility through mobility - remains quite under-theorised and not widely 
explored. The two mutually related arguments that underpin this paper are the following. First, 
mobility is not only an object of control but also a “political technology” (Foucault, 2012) of 
migration govermentality that is enacted by directly or indirectly keeping migrants on the move - 
disrupting their autonomous mobility and forcing them to undertake convoluted geographies. 
Second, the effects generated on migrants’ lives and movements are not only forced hyper-mobility 
but also spatial dispersal and modes of containment beyond detention - that is, containment is not 
only enforced by keeping migrants in detention but also by obstructing and disrupting their 
autonomous movements. This paper explores mobility as a political technology considering it from 
a twofold angle: on the one hand, the modes of containment beyond detention put into place by 
states for regaining control over unruly migration movements; on the other, strategies of migrant 
dispersal that are enacted by local and national authorities. Through such an analysis, this essay 
questions the taken for granted nexus between mobility and freedom, in light of the use of mobility 
for governing migration: indeed, a focus on modes of migration control that hinges on mobility as a 
political technology of governmentality leads us to disjoin freedom and mobility, with the latter 
which in liberal discourses tends to be conceived as one of the main ways in which the former is 
fully actualised. 
In so doing, this paper does not look at asylum seekers transferred from one city to another - see for 
instance Nick Gill’s work (Gill, 2009a). Rather, it takes into account more invisible and unofficial 
strategies to keep migrants on the move and to force them to divert their routes or to undertake the 
same journey multiple times - by pushing them away from critical border zones or by hampering 
them to stay in a given place. In most cases, these unofficial or indirect forced displacements take 
place as part of a grey area of non-registered state’s practices, recalling what Alison Mountz defines 
“hidden geographies” that are generated through “what is not known in the realm of 
displacement” (Mountz, 2011: 318). The paper proceeds as follows. The first section makes some 
theoretical clarifications on mobility and migration and discusses the scholarship that has 
approached mobility as a technology of migration governmentality. The article moves on by 
focusing on the practices for regulating unruly mobility in France, the eviction of Calais, and two 
internal European frontiers – the Italian-Swiss border and the Italian-French border. It illustrates 
how migrants are not only repeatedly bounced back at the border but also how they are transferred 
to the South of Italy not in order to block them there but to lengthen, divert and deter their journeys. 
The essay concludes with an analysis of the convoluted geographies that migrants undertake across 
Europe due to the Dublin Regulation  and the increasing illegalization of asylum seekers.  1
Mobility as a technique of government ? 
The government and the obstruction of migration movements are also enacted through (forced) 
mobility, and not only by generating immobility and enforcing detention. Such an approach speaks 
to William Walters’s notion of “viapolitics”: this latter entails considering that vehicles are 
surprisingly missing in migration theories, while they structure and make possible the materiality of 
migration movements as well as of the governmental measures through which migrants are 
managed (Walters, 2015). In this regard, a clarification is needed about “mobility” and “migration” 
and on how I use these terms throughout the paper. First, this article deals specifically with 
migrants’ mobility, and not with mobility as such, showing that state authorities try to regain control 
over unruly migration not only by detaining or deporting migrants but also by keeping them on the 
move and forcing them to undertake convoluted geographies. Second, in order to analytically 
distinguish migration from mobility, I argue that when someone’s mobility is defined as migration, 
means that his/her mobility appears as a problem, that is as something to be governed and 
controlled. As Bridget Anderson has aptly remarked, “migration signifies problematic mobility. 
People have always moved, and human movement is only contingently constituted as an object of 
investigation and a problem for policy […]. “Migration”  already signals the need for control and in 
public discourse is often raced and classed”. (Anderson, 2017: 1532). It follows that being governed 
as a migrant does not concern only people on the move: immobility, strandedness and temporal 
The Dublin Regulation, implemented in 1997 and then revised in 2003 and 2013 establishes the Member State 1
responsible for the examination of the asylum application. The Dublin Regulation has been conceived to prevent so 
called “asylum shopping”, that is, migrants who claim asylum in more than one country. Although there are three main 
criteria for determining what is the state responsible for examining the asylum application ( family connections, valid 
residence document or visa, first country of entry) the most frequently used is the “first country of entry”. http://eur-
l e x . e u r o p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t / E N / A L L / ; j s e s s i o n i d = j H N l T p 3 H L j q w 8 m q G b Q S p Z h 1 V W p j C y -
 VQq14Hgcztw4pbfSQZffnrn!557467765?uri=CELEX:32013R0604 . Although the effective number of migrants who 
are returned to the first EU country of entry under Dublin is not high, the Dublin Regulation is used as a tactic of 
deterrence for discouraging migrants to claim asylum and threatening them to be taken back.
suspension are all part of the heterogenous migrant conditions.  
Third, despite migration and mobility cannot be conflated, I do not take here mobility as a 
synonymous of movement. Building on Tim Cresswell's seminal work, mobility should not be 
confused with mere spatial displacement - movement from a point A to a point B (Creswell, 2006): 
mobility is always shaped by and takes place within specific configurations of power relations, 
which also determine the differential restrictions for the people to move and, therefore, the 
hierarchies of mobility. To put it otherwise, mobility itself is always historically and politically 
determined, being differently regulated by multiple legal, technological and administrative 
measures. Thus, mobility cannot be assumed as a transhistorical or universal category, nor it can be 
equated with the kinetic act of moving. Relatedly, mobility is source of data extraction and 
circulation - e.g. the biometric data collected at the national frontiers (Amoore, 2006). Thus, I 
oppose here to any “generic conception of mobility in favour of a view of mobility as an 
accomplishment that is always contextual, and enacted by means of specific assemblages of bodies, 
machines, infrastructures, communication devices, conduct, and so on” (Walters, 2015: 472). 
This article stems from a combination of ethnographic work and research fieldwork that I 
conducted between Italy and France, in 2015 and 2017 , and analyses of institutional documents 2
and public statements released by French and Italian authorities, as well as data and statistics I 
collected from NGOs and international organisations. I have decided to use the general expression 
“governing migrants’ mobility through mobility” to analyse the different ways in which mobility is 
used as a technology for governing illegalized migrants across Europe, and for decelerating, 
diverting and troubling their movements. I am interested here in mapping the forms of direct and 
indirect displacements to which they are subjected, and not to state-led migration programmes. 
Therefore, by focusing on illegalized migrants, I explore how mobility is not only one of the (many) 
components and experiences of migration; it is also used as a technology of government. 
The EU’s fight against intra-European migrant movements is a case in point, I suggest, for 
investigating the modes of governing migrants’ mobility through mobility. The erratic geographies  3
enacted by migrants who try to dodge the spatial restrictions imposed by the Dublin Regulation and 
the increasing population of “refugees in orbit” (Moreno-Lax, 2012) across Europe, are not side-
 I. conducted fieldwork in France in the city of Paris (October 2015 and November 2016) in Calais (October 2015 and 2
April 2017) and in Marseille (September 2015, June 2016 and March-April 2017), interviewing migrants, local 
institutions and French NGOs, between September 2015 and December 2016. Concerning the fieldwork in Italy, see 
page 9.  
 Through such an expression I refer to the convoluted and circular movements undertaken by those migrants who are 3
bounced back at the internal frontiers of Europe or who are forced to stay on the move for long time, before eventually 
reaching their destination. 
effects of the measures of containment. On the contrary, through forced mobility states try to regain 
control over migrant movements by keeping migrants on the move and generating effects of 
containment and rerouting that go beyond detention (Garelli, Tazzioli, 2016).  
The fact that mobility is both an object of government and a technique for disciplining unruly 
movements has been touched upon by scholars in different academic fields, as I flesh out in this 
section. Yet, it remains a relatively marginal aspect in the literature on migration. In the book 
Return: Nationalising Transnational Mobility in Asia (2013), Xiang Biao, Brenda S.A. Yeoh and 
Mika Toyota provide an original and compelling analysis of state-led migration return programmes 
and policies in Asia, contending that migrant workers’ returns should be seen as part of states’ 
strategies to renationalise migration through the enforcement of regulated mobility: “this mode of 
governance seeks to regulate mobility through mobility. States govern mobility not by blocking but 
by fa-cilitating movements […] returns thus nationalise transnational mobility” (Biao et al., 2013: 
3). Similarly, in the article “A New Mobility Regime in the Making”, Xiang Biao illustrates a shift 
in contemporary Chinese migration politics, “from a policy of ‘blocking’ to a strategy of 
‘channelling’: government does not attempt to stop migration anymore, but still regards tight regu-
lation as necessary in order to achieve an ‘orderly movement’” (Biao, 2007: 5). These analyses 
bring into focus the incorporation of mobility into political strategies and concrete measures for 
channelling migrations, both to regain control over them and in order to capitalise on mobility, 
extracting value from it. That is, return migration schemes are constitutive of national and 
transnational economies that are grounded on migrant labour. The regulation of migration through 
migration consists in a series of state and inter-state programmes on the basis of a “just in time and 
to the point” rationale that is particularly glaring in circular migration (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013: 
67). Yet, what I look at in this paper does not concern migrant labour schemes and are not even 
comprehensive and targeted to state’s economic politics but, rather, are measures adopted for 
disciplining and containing migration movements through forced mobility. 
Some scholars of the Mobility Studies literature have pointed to the way in which mobility is also 
part of a political technology for governing movements. Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt has rightly stressed 
that in the literature “the main emphasis remains on the government of mobility rather than on 
government through mobility”, (Bærenholdt, 2013: 26), gesturing towards analyses that, instead of 
spatialising mobility as merely movements that occur across predefined spaces, start from mobility 
as a technique of government. By introducing the notion of “governmobility” Bærenholdt focuses 
on the ways in which in con-temporary societies “the regulation of mobilities are internalised in 
people’s mobile practices” including bodily, technological and institutional forms of self-
government, which are enacted relationally and embedded in systems” (Bærenholdt, 2013: 29). In 
this way, he turns the attention from the materiality of practices for disciplining “unruly” 
movements towards the modalities in which mobility as a technique of government has become part 
of rationales of self-government. From a similar perspective, Anne Jensen pushes us to “see 
mobility as part of governing logics” (Jensen, 2013: 262) while Ole B. Jensen and Tim Richardson 
take into account the structural role of mobility in the construction and functioning of the EU 
(Jensen, Richardson, 2004). The way in which Mobility Studies conceive of mobility as a technique 
of government is, however, from the point of view of how contemporary liberal societies necessitate 
mobility for regulating social and economic phenomena: mobility is assumed as a relatively 
homogenous practice, although people’s access to mobility is subjected to processes of 
hierarchization and inequality.  
What I am interested in here is, instead, to elaborate on how the presence and movements of some 
people are the object of measures of containment beyond detention: that is, how migrants’ 
movements are diverted, decelerated and obstructed. In this case, what is enforced is not mobility as 
such – in the sense of the autonomy and the right to move: rather, mobility functions here as a form 
of containment, interrupting and disrupting migrants’ geographies and autonomous movements. 
Scholars in the field of Mobility Studies actually tend to conceive mobility in terms of circulation, 
analysing how this latter is regulated, strengthened and managed, and conferring a positive meaning 
to mobility, conceived as the essence of freedom. But does circulation represent the appropriate 
figure of mobility in order to account for the geographies of those migrants who are not allowed to 
(smoothly) move? Ultimately, as Aradau and Blanke have stressed in their analysis of the economy 
of circulation, “if governmental analyses need to reintroduce sovereign and disciplinary power to 
account for the differentiation between good and bad circulation, the sociology of mobility similarly 
does not question mobility itself” (Aradau, Blanke, 2010: 46). In fact, the production of “abject 
subjects” (Nyers, 2003) who are forced to move outside the authorised channels of mobility 
constitutes the inherent correlate, although usually invisible, of circuits of free circulation. If we go 
back to Foucault’s description of modern governmental rationale, which is predicated upon “the 
division between good and bad circulation” (Foucault, 2007: 18), two related questions can be 
raised: what about those individuals who are discarded as “bad circulation" and who are 
nevertheless governed through (forced) mobility – and not only through blockages and immobility? 
In the place of “bad circulation" should we rather speak of practices of mobility outside circuits of 
circulation? 
In the field of carceral geography, the use of mobility as a strategy of government is tackled by 
bringing in the reality of forced movements; that is to say, these scholars highlight that (some) 
migrations are regulated through forced mobility – and not by enforcing and facilitating migration. 
This literature takes a distance from the above-mentioned works that deal with mobility in terms of 
(free) circulation: the forced transfers of migrants from one detention centre to the other are the 
main case in point analysed by these scholars (Conlon, Moran, Gill, 2013; Hiemstra, 2013; Loyd, 
Mountz, 2014; Martin, Mitchelsson, 2009). In particular, Nick Gill mobilises the notion of 
“governmental mobility” to illustrate the “governmental effect of the mobility of the asylum 
seekers” (Gill, 2009b: 187), referring to the forced transfers migrants are subjected to in the UK, 
when they are moved from one detention estate to another, with the result of preventing the 
consolidation of networks of support around them. Carceral geography literature equips us with 
appropriate analytical tools for elaborating on mobility as a measure for regaining control over 
autonomous migration movements. However, migrants’ erratic geographies that I discuss in this 
paper are induced and forced by state authorities not only through official transfers from one 
detention center to another, but also in a more indirect and informal way. In migration geography, 
Jonathan Darling has pushed the debate further by speaking about the “UK asylum dispersal 
system” (Darling, 2016) highlighting that asylum seekers are scattered across the UK, being 
transferred by the authorities in small groups into hosting centres often located far from urban 
contexts. As I will show, migrants are moved not to detain them but to push them further away; or 
they are indirectly forced to move under their own means in order to dodge controls or escape 
deportations. To push this further, we should investigate whether forms of containment through 
mobility are put into place beyond the “carceral circuits" (Gill et al. 2017).  
The fourth stream of literature that deals with mobility as a technology of government is closely 
connected with the migration context I focus on in this paper, that is, migrant movements across 
Europe. Works on the so called “Dublined migrants” highlight the erratic geographies that migrants 
are forced to undertake due to the spatial restrictions imposed on them by the Dublin Regulation. 
This literature brings attention to the fact that migrants are ultimately kept on the move and forced 
in a way to restart their journeys many times (Brekker, 2015; Fontanari, 2016; Schuster, 2011a, 
2011b). In particular, they stress the hypermobility that the Dublin Regulation generates, giving rise 
to a population of “refugees in orbit” (Moreno-Lax, 2012). According to this scholarship, to be 
relevant is less the state of permanent and convoluted mobility that the Dublin Regulation generates 
on migrants’ lives than to recognise that “disruptive practices such as expulsions and deportations 
produce existential conditions of precariousness, restlessness and stuckness at the same 
time” (Picozza, 2017: 237).  
 Schuster rightly gestures towards an analysis of the juridical conundrums and of the material 
hindrances that asylum seekers encounter because of to the Dublin Regulation and due to the 
strategies employed by states to reduce the number of asylum applicants (Schuster, 2011a). To be 
more precise, the relationship between juridical level and material obstacles is, far from being a 
linear one: the latter are in fact the outcome not only of law enforcement but also of a series of 
racialising mechanisms that change over time and established differences among migrants .In this 4
sense, as remarked by legal geography scholarship “the unfolding of spatialities” (Blomley et al. 
2001: XVI) of control is substantially shaped by the legal boundaries set by national and European 
laws and, however, it is inflected also by the specific and uneven ways in which these latter are 
enacted.  
Migrants subjected to the Dublin Regulation are de facto in a permanent state of transit even whilst 
they are physically blocked at the borders or juridically stranded. Building on these analyses, I want 
to expand here on what in these works remains undertheorized and seen as a mere consequence of 
measures of migration containment and control: forced mobility as a strategy of migration 
governmentality. Assuming this involves bringing attention to the effects of containment beyond 
physical confinement that are produced on migrants who are kept on the move. Furthermore, this 
paper does not focus specifically on migrants who are transferred under Dublin Regulation; rather, 
and more broadly, it takes into account the movements of illegalized migrants across Europe that 
are tackled by states as undisciplined mobilities and forms of “spatial disobedience” (Tazzioli, 
2015). These forms of migration correspond to what the European Union defines as “secondary 
movements”. This is a term that, however, I deliberately refuse to employ to address migrants’ 
erratic geographies as an outcome of states’ attempt to regulate and contain migration mobility 
through forced mobility. Indeed, the term “secondary movements” has a specific governmental 
genealogy and requires to be critically unpacked, in the light of the EU migration glossary at large.  
“Secondary movements” is a term used by the EU to designate the convoluted and erratic routes 
that migrants undertake across Europe as an outcome of push-backs at internal frontiers, spatial 
restrictions imposed by the Dublin Regulation and rejected asylum applications. The introduction of 
the term on an EU level reinforces the image of migrant linear routes, moving from one point to 
another, while those movements that do not respond to this geographical pace, are disqualified as 
“secondary” (Zimmerman, 2009). Yet, the widespread use of the term highlights the attempt by 
member states to regain control over autonomous migrants’ geographies.  
 Nationality is for instance one of the main criteria through which states enact the Dublin Regulation in a differential 4
way.
Containment through mobility at the Italian frontiers: 
Como and Ventimiglia, two Italian cities respectively located at the border with Switzerland and 
France, have become critical border-zones for migrants in transit. Ventimiglia is not a newly built 
frontier; in April 2011 France temporarily suspended the Schengen Treaty, obstructing entrance to 
French territory for Tunisian migrants who had arrived in Italy after the outbreak of the Tunisian 
revolution (Garelli, 2013). For Tunisians, Ventimiglia became a tough border on their way to 
France. However, Ventimiglia turned out to be a racialized intermittent frontier: in both 2011 and 
2015 Schengen was in fact suspended only for third-country nationals and so identity checks were 
made by French authorities on the train connecting Milan to Marseille, essentially on the basis of 
people’s skin colour. In contrast to Ventimiglia, the transformation of Como into a border zone is far 
more recent: as the activists of Como Senza Frontiere, a network supporting migrants in transit, 
point out: “despite its geographical location – being a frontier-post close to the Switzerland – Como 
had never been an effective border for migrants until summer 2016” . Indeed, migrants who wanted 5
to move to Germany used to take the train in Milan and cross directly to Switzerland without 
stopping in Como. Yet, since Swiss authorities enforced border controls in late June 2016, Como 
has become a forced stopping point for migrants who then end up temporarily stranded in the city. 
The material and the information that I present in this section is the result of the fieldwork I 
conducted in Ventimiglia and in Como between August 2016 and January 2017. The fieldwork 
included participatory observation and semi-structured interviews with local authorities, NGOs 
(Doctors without Borders and Caritas), the Red Cross, the police, citizens supporting migrants near 
the Church of Ventimiglia, and interviews with Sudanese and Eritrean migrants in transit. 
By bringing attention to the ways in which migrants have been forcibly moved  or indirectly kept 
into movement by Italian authorities and bounced back by the Swiss and the French police what 
emerge are modes of containment through (forced) mobility; that is to say, border tactics that consist 
in regaining control over unruly movements, not by fully stopping migrants but, rather, by forcing 
them to follow erratic geographies and to bounce across borders. These border tactics are predicated 
upon a politics of dispersal of migrant multiplicities. Speaking about containment through mobility 
could appear to be an oxymoron: to what extent can migrants’ presence and movements be 
contained through mobility? The notion of “containment” remains in fact fundamentally under- 
 Interview with activists from the network Como senza Frontiere, January 5, 2016.5
theorised in the  scholarship and tends to be equated with detention or confinement. Instead, I argue 
that there is the need to analytically distinguish containment from these related notions that convey 
a sense of distinction between a spatial inside and an outside. Although containment can consist in 
spatial segregation or in temporary detention, however it is not narrowed to spatial  confinement 
and it can be defined, in a wider way, in terms of spatial restrictions imposed on the migrants that 
also generate temporal suspension. In fact, spatial restrictions do not necessarily involve immobility 
or strandedness; they can also consist in convoluted or repeated movements that migrants are forced 
to undertake, diverting from their established routes. 
To put it differently, containment is actualized through a series of different strategies for limiting 
migrants’ autonomous movements, not only by generating strandedness and immobility, but also by 
keeping migrants on the move. More than a policy of constant tracking and pervasive control, 
containment through forced mobility is in part the outcome of a triple governmental “retreat”: not 
seeing, not dealing with and not protecting the migrants in transit. Therefore, containment through 
mobility refers to the obstructions, decelerations and restrictions generated on migrants’ 
geographies, beyond detention and spatial confinement. As I explained in the introduction, 
containment is not narrowed to a physical dimension: it includes measures and policies that troubles 
and hinder migrants’ movements and can also generates temporal suspension – e.g. the juridical 
limbo in which many migrants are and that generate strandedness and condition of indefinite wait. 
This latter  should not be seen as a side-effect of spatial confinement. Indeed, building on Doreen 
Massey, who notably has insisted “on the inseparability of time and space” (Massey, 1992: 84) and 
on the temporal dimension as something that is constitutive of geography, I consider temporal 
suspension as one of the ways in which containment is enacted. More precisely, the EU border 
regime is not only formed by spatial restrictions but also by temporal borders, meaning by that 
deadlines that migrants are forced to comply with - for instance, in order to enter the channels of the 
asylum or to receive special protection etc. - as well as migrants’ indefinite temporal suspension 
(Amilhat-Szary, Giraut, 2015; Tazzioli, 2018). 
The invisibilisation of migrants who pass through these border-zones and who are ‘bounced’ many 
times from one side of the border to the other – being pushed back by the French and Swiss police – 
contrasts with a representation of the border spectacle that has been enacted by states and mobilized 
by scholars in the past for narrating the “crisis” and the “emergency” of migrants’ presence. Accord-
ing to the Italian Red Cross, around 9000 migrants have transited through Ventimiglia since the 
opening of the transit camp in the town and about 3000 have passed through Como. Swiss 
authorities reported that 17,500 migrants were pushed back from Switzerland to Italy from June 
2016 until the end of the year . However, as Sander Rajan points out, official statistics lead to 6
“certain forms of blindness as a part of the rationality of a certain mode of seeing and accounting 
for the population” (Rajan, 2006: 99). “Seeing like a state” conceals practices, such as the ones 
recounted to me by activists in Como in December 2016: migrants who are apprehended at the 
border at night are taken back by force to Italy and dropped in Como without notification of their 
expulsion.  
On this point, it is worth highlighting the articulations and the discrepancies between legal and 
formal regulations on the one hand, and informal police measures on the other. As Cetta 
Mainwaring and Margaret Walton-Roberts have remarked, while migration scholarship “has tended 
to focus on formal laws as enacted by the sovereign states”, there is a need to shift the attention to 
“the geopolitical margins of the state” (Mainwaring, Walton-Roberts, 2018: 2); and, in parallel to 
this, I suggest, we should reorient the analysis towards the margins of the formal law and 
jurisdiction, in order to investigate how administrative measures and local decrees are impact on 
migrant’s lives and movements. If we consider the spatial strategies enforced by the police at the 
Italian-French border and at the Italian-Swiss one, these should be read as frantic attempts on the 
part of the states to regain control over migration movements, more than as a planned strategy of 
migration management. Thus, in order to grasp the spaces of control that are opened up by using 
mobility as a technology of government, we need to shift the attention from the official legal 
channels of asylum and migration policies towards administrative measures that determine 
migrants’ convoluted geographies. In this regard, Tugba Basaran has compellingly noticed that, “the 
undefined multiplication of border zones” does actually take place “by administrative 
regulation” (Basaran, 2008: 346). However, in this case the spaces of control are not narrowed to 
delimited border zones; in fact, they exceed territorially bounded places and include migrants’ 
forced displacements as well. Measures for dispersing migrants and keep them on the move do not 
involve constant monitoring nor they can be analysed in terms of direct surveillance. Far from being 
constantly tracked, migrants are governed through invisibilisation, and their movements are 
restricted through material obstacles and also through tactics of deterrence or by preventing them 
from settling in a given place. July 2016, Ventimiglia: the first forced transfers by bus of migrants 
from the French-Italian border to the hotspot in Taranto, 1200 km from Ventimiglia, took place. In 
September these internal deportations became a weekly routine, and the same measure was 
extended to Como: migrants who have been pushed back from France and Switzerland are then 
taken by the Italian police to the South of Italy, with the final goal not of hindering their further 
 Data given by the Red Cross of Como, January 2017.6
movement but of lengthening and diverting their journeys . Migrants are not kept in detention. After 7
being fingerprinted and identified again, they are released: both the humanitarian and the security 
‘hold’ over migrant lives is withdrawn. Although many of the pushed back migrants return to 
Ventimiglia and Como in a matter of days, it is possible to understand their forced ongoing 
movement as a form of containment. Extenuating migrants by moving them across or forcing them 
to move away is at the same time a strategy of deterrence and a way to empty critical border zones 
and divide migrant multiplicities: “we cannot leave any group of migrants to assemble here, we 
must lighten and empty the frontier” , the Director of the Italian Police, Franco Gabrielli, declared 8
significantly. This illustrates that the interventions conducted in informal encampments and hotspot-
like spaces are not about control in terms of surveillance, nor about detention. Rather, they consist 
in scattering migrants across spaces, generating containment through forced mobility and removing 
“dangerous” migrants from the others: together with the migrants “bounced back” at the border, 
those who take part to visible protests are removed from the cities that have become frontiers. Thus, 
the government of mobility as a government through (forced) mobility brings to the fore the effects 
of containment generated beyond constant surveillance and physical detention. The forced internal 
transfers to the South of Italy and the consequent lengthening and rerouting of migrants’ journeys 
show the effects of containment generated on migrants’ movements and lives through forced 
mobility.  
Containment entails a certain degree of constriction, that is of forced mobility, which is well 
illustrated in the context of internal transfers from Como and Ventimiglia. Push-backs, internal 
deportations, decrees of expulsion but also migrants who are forced to reroute their journeys or to 
escape a place, due to rising controls: all these mobilities generate effects of containment of 
migrants’ geographies that do not necessarily involve detention and that are predicated upon a 
certain constrictive dimension. On both sides of the French-Italian border, national authorities 
prevent any possible formation of collectives, dividing and scattering migrant multiplicities. This 
strategy of dispersal – which consists in scattering and dividing migrant groups across space – is 
combined with exclusionary criteria of access to both the camps and the asylum procedure. The 
institutional channels of asylum are at the same time spatial traps for many migrants – demanding 
protection entails leaving one's own digital trace and involves a sort of “geographical 
https://www.ilsalto.net/migranti-ventimiglia-stamp/: https://openmigration.org/analisi/como-continua-il-gioco-delloca-7
sulla-pelle-dei-migranti/
 http://www.sanremonews.it/2016/08/08/leggi-notizia/argomenti/cronaca/articolo/8
ventimiglia-emer-genza-migranti-il-capo-della-polizia-franco-gabrielli-assicura-gia-pianificate-
o.html
fixation” (Foucault, 2016: 23) – and what states try to restrict access to, preventively hampering 
some migrants from laying the asylum claim. 
The politics of migrant dispersal in France: 
The current French migration context represents an advantageous viewpoint for grasping the 
government of migrant mobility through mobility and how this affects migrants’ lives and journeys. 
This is in part due to the geographical position of France, which is not a first country of arrival. For 
many migrants France is a country of transit that, however, turns out to be a twofold spatial trap. 
Indeed, for some migrants it is a space where they remain stranded and where they end up in 
claiming asylum because they do not manage to go to the UK, while for others it is a place from 
which they are returned by force to other European states, as “Dubliners”, or to their country of 
origin. In particular, the government of mobility through (forced) mobility can be closely analysed 
here by following the strategies of migrant dispersal across space put into place by French 
authorities. By speaking of politics of dispersal I refer to a series of measures of deterrence and 
internal transfer through which migrant multiplicities are divided and scattered across the territory . 9
My take on the politics of dispersal resonates with the work done by Jonathan Darling about the 
“(en)forced immobility of asylum seekers through dispersal” (Darling, 2016b: 230) in the UK. 
Research on the politics of refugee dispersal has been conducted also from the standpoint of the 
deprivation and mistrust that it generates on asylum seekers (Hynes, 2009). Yet, I analyse this not 
through the lens of the privatisation of migrant reception centres, nor by looking at the production 
of social exclusion, but as part of a political strategy to divide migrant multiplicities in order to 
prevent the formation of collective subjects. Dispersal, I suggest, is one of the ways in which the 
governing of migrant mobility through mobility is effectively enacted, with a twofold purpose: 
disciplining migrants individually - discouraging them to come back - and, at the same time, 
dividing and neutralising temporary migrant multiplicities (Tazzioli, 2016). Importantly. bringing 
attention to the politics of dispersal entails considering both direct and indirect modes of forced 
displacement. Direct modes of forced mobility consist in the ways in which migrants “are 
moved” (Biao, Lindquist, 2014: 131) by national authorities – e.g. forced internal transfers – while 
by indirect modes of forced mobility I mean migrants ending up undertaking erratic geographies – 
Through the expression “migrants multiplicities” I build refer to the presence of temporary and heterogenous groups of 9
migrants, who assemble at border-zones or in the cities and that are usually divided, selected and scattered across space, 
as they represent potential collective political subjects. 
in order avoid to be returned on the basis of the Dublin Regulation. The strategy of spatial dispersal 
should be seen in the light of a “hold” over migrant lives that addresses and affects migrants both 
individually and as part of temporary multiplicities: individual migrants’ geographies are subjected 
to temporal interruption, blockages and diversions; at the same time, the same strategies of dispersal 
prevent and neutralize the transformation of migrant multiplicities into political subjects. 
In this way, migrants are not only kept on the move and forced to partly restart their journey, they 
are also invisibilized, both individually and as part of temporary groups. Yet, what characterizes the 
politics of migrant dispersal in France is not exclusively the spatial scattering and the division of 
migrant multiplicities, nor the effect of hypermobility that this generates on migrants, but the traps 
of humanitarianism through which these measures have been enacted in France between 2015 and 
2016. Traps of humanitarianism refer to the ways in which humanitarian discourses and interven-
tions are mobilized to convince migrants to move from Calais or from Paris – which are considered 
by French authorities the most critical migration sites – to hosting centres, located in the country-
side or in remote places, from where they are deported. Migrants have in fact been cheated by 
French authorities, who encouraged them to move to those centres with the promise of  not being 
transferred back to other member states and not being allowed to claim asylum .   10
October  2015, Calais: French authorities start a series of migrant raids and arrests in Calais and in 
the so called “jungle” – a migrant camp – which was located about three kilometres away from the 
city centres. These raids were made with the purpose of “emptying Calais”  in the face of the 11
increasing number of migrants stranded there, and initially migrants were taken by force in small 
groups to detention centres located across France. At that time, I was based in Marseille, where 
some of the migrants arrested in Calais were transferred and put into the detention centre of 
LeCanet , situated in a peripheral neighbourhood of the city. In this case, internal transfers from 12
the North to the South could appear as modes of containment through detention, insofar as migrants 
were put in detention. Yet, building on a literature that in the face of migrant deportations we should 
investigate what happens after the spectacular and violent act of removal (De Genova, 2018; Khos-
ravi, 2016), even in the case of forced internal transfers it is fundamental to gesture towards a an 
analysis of the “afterwards” of detention and control, meaning by that an investigation that moves 
Since the majority of the migrants who entered France “illegally” had been fingerprinted for the first time in Italy or in 10
other EU member states, and so on the basis of the Dublin Regulation they can be returned to these countries. 
This is the expression used by the former French Ministry of the Interior Bernard Cazeneuve. 11
http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/10/25/a-marseille-les-migrants-de-calais-accueillis-dans-un-arrondissement-12
fn_1524302 
away from the punctual and visible moment of migrants put in detention. Indeed, after no more than 
five days, migrants taken to LeCanet were usually re-leased and “dropped” out of the gate of the 
detention center. Migrants had to find their own way to the main rail station of Marseille St-Charles, 
and from there they took the train to go back to Paris in order then to reach Calais again. At the rail 
station, migrants were unofficially allowed to board TGV train, and for a limited period of time the 
French rail company SNCF gave the migrants free tickets to Paris. Some migrants undertook that 
counter-route from Calais to Marseille on buses rented by the French authorities and then came 
back to the jungle of Calais, under their own means, two or three times in the span of two months.  
Thus, similarly to the migrants dropped out in the countryside of Taranto after being taken there 
from Ventimiglia and Como, the purpose and the outcome of mi-grants’ forced transfers in France 
was not at all detention as such. Rather, being moved back – through channels of internal forced 
transfers – to the South of France, migrants were de facto forced to move around, that is to enact 
erratic geographies across the country. Migrants’ exhaustive repeated journeys produced a mixed 
effect of deterrence and obstruction of their geographies. Measures of containment through mobility 
disrupted and interrupted migrants’ movements across Europe but also troubled their spatial 
presence and their permanence: thus, migrants are hampered not only from moving but also from 
staying. In fact, the politics of dispersal, characterized by modes of government of mobility through 
forced mobility, impacted on individual migrant lives, producing effect of deterrence and disrupting 
their geographies and, at the same time, generating a twofold temporary invisibility. First, through 
tactics of dispersal, migrants are spatially invisiblized being moved away from the Calais “border 
spectacle" (De Genova, 2013). Second, and connected to the former point, migrants are politically 
invisibilized as one of the main targets of tactics of dispersal consists in dividing and partitioning 
migrant multiplicities as potential collective subjects. 
After the first series of arrests, in November 2015 French authorities changed their strategy to 
temporarily “emptying” Calais and Paris: instead of being transferred by force to detention centres, 
migrants in Calais and in Paris had been approached by local Prefectures and humanitarian 
organisations, such as France Terre d’Asile, who encouraged them to move to “Centres de répit” – 
literally, “centres of rest” – a new nomenclature introduced by France in October 2015 to designate 
hosting centres for asylum seekers. Nevertheless, whilst migrants were convinced to go there with 
the promise of receiving assistance and protection, actually a few of them, after arriving in the 
“centres de répit”, were in fact returned by force to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. 
“Mise à l’abri” – literally, giving a shelter – is the French expression used in official discourses and 
institutional documents to justify the eviction of temporary migrant encampments – namely, self-
organised spaces of refuge and transit, in particular inside the city of Paris – such as the occupation 
of the square at LaChapelle, the self-organised tent camps near the metro of Stalingrad and the 
metro Jaures. Thus, migrants’ displacement was not only the result of forced internal transfers but 
also of the promises of asylum. At the end of November 2015, French authorities estimated that out 
of the 6000 migrants based at that time in the jungle of Calais, around 2000 had been moved to 
hosting centres and detention centres across France . 13
 The nexus between humanitarianism and mobility (as a technology of government) emerges at the 
core of modes of containment through displacement. The strategy of migrant dispersal and the 
captures of humanitarianism were also decisively enacted during the massive eviction of the Jungle 
of Calais, which took place in October 2016. The eviction was presented in the media as a mix of 
police, security and humanitarian interventions: migrants were ordered to leave the jungle and the 
police entering the camp starting to remove the tents. After being identified by the police with the 
support of humanitarian actors, migrants were divided in groups and transferred by bus to hosting 
centres across France, previously “Centres de répit” which had by then been renamed “Centres 
d’Accueil et Orientation” (CAO) – “Centres of hosting and orientation” . After few days, the 14
eviction of the jungle was declared completed by the authorities, after the migrants who had been 
the most reluctant to move away were convinced by the French Minister of the Interior Bernard 
Cazeneuve that they would be allowed to claim asylum, even if their fingerprints had already been 
stored in EURODAC by Italy, thus making an exception to the Dublin Regulation: “no 
Dublinage”  for the migrants in Calais. In fact, CAOs turned out to be humanitarian traps for the 15
migrants who consented to be moved there: upon arrival on the CAO, about 43% were considered 
by the local Prefectures to be people subject to the Dublin Regulation , and that they therefore 16
needed to be returned to the first EU country of entry reaching a peak of 75% among migrants 
coming from the jungle of Calais. Thus, many escaped the CAO after few days and before officially 
laying their asylum claim. More than fixing migrants to a place or detaining them indefinitely, both 
In 2015 the number of the migrants in the jungle of Calais raised from 2000 to about 7000. However, it is remarkable 13
that, actually, there are no exact statistics but only estimations of the migrant population in Calais.
This is the denomination given by the French Home Office: 14
  https://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/min_int_logement_2016-07_charte_fonctionnement_cao.pdf.  
  http://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/migrants/calais-cazeneuve-donne-des-garanties-sur-l-avenir-des-15
migrants-4586411 
 http://www.lacimade.org/dublin-vers-un-durcissement/ . However, then only the 24% of the asylum applicants 16
in France have been effectively put in the Dublin procedure in 2016. 
forced and “voluntary” transfers of migrants from Calais and Paris to reception centres and then to 
the CAOs  boosted a generalized (forced) mobility and multiplied migrants’ erratic geographies 17
across France, as well as towards other member states like Belgium. Marseille, March 2017: in the 
peripheral thirteenth arrondissement of the city, the named “Vento Mai”, in a building close to a 
residential area which is about forty minutes away from the city centre by public transport. That is, 
given the remote location of the CAO, migrants are kept out of sight by French authorities, and they 
are subjected to government through “opacity” (Pinelli, 2017). In this case, opacity does not refer to 
the invisibilization of migrants nor to the partial invisibility of forced transfers per se, but to a sort 
of legal and procedural confusion through which migrants are often managed. 47 migrants were 
hosted there, among which three had been transferred from Paris in November 2016, while all had 
been taken there from Calais by bus, a few days after the eviction of the “jungle”. “When the first 
group of migrants arrived from Calais in October, after the first night three of them escaped”, the 
manager of the CAO explained to me; indeed, none of them wanted to claim asylum in France, in 
particular because they did not believe the promise made by the government – that nobody would 
be taken back to Italy on the basis of the Dublin Regulation. They knew that it could be a trap” . 18
Hence, a focus on the French context enables us to see that the government of migrant movements 
through forced mobility and by dispersing migrants across space, generates containment, meaning 
substantial disruptions of autonomous migrant movements and of the possibility to stay in a place. 
Thus, firstly, the taking away of terrain from migrants subtraction and the obstruction of 
autonomous geographies are two simultaneous and mutually related effects of the measures of 
containment through mobility. Secondly, the politics of dispersal that is visibly at stake in France 
shows that modes of containment through mobility do not only target migrants on an individual 
basis but also as part of multiplicities. To put it better, the government of mobility through (forced) 
mobility does not affect only individual migrants, whose routes are diverted and disrupted, but also 
migrants as part of multiplicities, insofar as they appear as potential collective political subjects.  
Conclusion: 
“This is my fourth return to Ventimiglia, in fact I was taken to Taranto by bus twice in November, 
after being pushed back by the French police at the border, and then again two times this month. 
There are no statistics about the presences of migrants in these spaces of transit and of temporary refuge, as migrants 17
constantly move, and can return in those places more than once, as a result of the forced displacements and of migrants’ 
erratic geographies. 
 Interview with the manager of the CAO “Vento Mai”, Marseille, 24 March 2017. 18
The last one I didn’t even manage to cross the border; the Italian police arrested me while I was 
hanging around, together with other mates, near the rail station of Ventimiglia. I know about people 
who went up to ten times, back and forth from Ventimiglia to Taranto; every time is the same, we 
are taken there by bus, it takes one day to go there, and then we have to find the money to come 
here, under our own means, by train” . The direct testimonies of the migrants who have undertaken 19
the same route from Taranto to Ventimiglia after being taken there by force, have enabled NGOs 
and human rights organizations to reconstruct the functioning of the relatively invisible channels of 
forced transfers across Italy . The story that I reported above of the repeated forced movements 20
faced by M., a 26-year-old man from Sudan, tells us that the strategy of deterrence employed by 
states to discourage migrants from continuing their journeys, often generates a condition of forced 
and convoluted hyper-mobility. In fact, the government of migrant mobility through mobility is 
predicated upon measures of containment that do not consist (only) in producing conditions of 
immobility and strandedness, nor in migrants’ decision to give up: indeed, migrants’ unruly 
movements are contained insofar as they are disrupted, decelerated and diverted. 
Through this insight into the ways in which migrants are kept on the move or forced to undertake 
erratic geographies at the internal frontiers of Europe, this paper has pointed to the need of 
disjoining mobility and freedom, investigating how mobility is not only an object and a target of 
governmentality but also a political technology for regaining control over unruly and unauthorised 
migrants. In other words, the fact that migrants are not only governed through blockages and 
detention but also by keeping them on the move, entails challenging liberal understandings of 
mobility - which equate mobility with freedom - as well as analyses that oppose free mobility and 
forced mobility. In fact, as the above-mentioned migration contexts show, it is not a question of 
forced mobility in the sense of being transferred by force nor of being in a condition in which flight 
is the only solution. Rather, if in some cases mobility as a technique of governmentality consists in 
forced transfers made by the authorities, in many others it is about extenuating migrants - by 
making some spaces unliveable for them, by forcing them, also in an indirect way, to divert their 
routes or to do the same journey multiple times. This involves moving beyond the opposition 
between immobility and mobility, exploring instead how these two are differently and strategically 
played by migrants and by state authorities.  
Interview with a Sudanese migrant outside the church of Ventimiglia, December 27, 2016. 19
In 2016, about 123 000 migrants have claimed asylum in Italy, while the total number of asylum applicants in 2015 20
was of 82 000 and 63 000 in 2014. If we confront the number of asylum applications in 2016 and in 2015 with migrant 
arrivals (153 000 in 2015 and 173 000 in 2016), there has been an increased of more than 20 000 asylum claims 
between 2015 and 2016. The number of asylum seekers who have been denied of protection has increased, from 58% to 
65%. 
A future research agenda could engage in rethinking the articulation between freedom and mobility 
in light of convoluted movements that are generated by state measures for regaining control over 
unruly migration. 
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